EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The influence of self and social image concerns on lying

Zvonimir Bašić and Simone Quercia

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 133, issue C, 162-169

Abstract: We investigate the influence of self and social image concerns as potential sources of lying costs across two studies (n=991). In Experiment 1, in a standard die-rolling paradigm, we exogenously manipulate self-awareness and observability, which direct the focus of a person on their private and public selves, respectively. We find that our self-awareness manipulation has no effect on overreporting in comparison to a control treatment, while our observability manipulation significantly decreases reports. In Experiment 2, we introduce a design that allows to compare the effects of self and social image concerns by directing the focus either on oneself or on an external observer while keeping constant the set of observers and their information. In line with the results from Experiment 1, people lie significantly less when their focus is on the external observer rather than on themselves.

Keywords: Truth-telling; Lying; Private information; Self-image concerns; Social image concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825622000513
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: The Influence of Self and Social Image Concerns on Lying (2022) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:162-169

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.006

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:162-169