Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
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Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly with Buyouts or First Refusal Contracts pp. 153-180: Patrick Van Cayseele and Dave Furth
Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games pp. 181-191: Catherine Eckel and Philip Grossman
Convex Games and Stable Sets pp. 192-201: Ezra Einy and Benyamin Shitovitz
Non-well-founded-Type Spaces pp. 202-217: Aviad Heifetz
Evolutionary Analyses of Tacit Communication in Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Game Experiments pp. 218-237: Yong-Gwan Kim
Simple Flow Games pp. 238-260: Hans Reijnierse, Michael Maschler, Jos Potters and Stef Tijs
Public Information Quality with Monopolistic Sellers pp. 261-279: Bharat Sarath
Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence pp. 280-302: Martin Sefton and Abdullah Yavas
Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game pp. 303-330: Dale Stahl
Quasi-weightings, Trading, and Desirability Relations in Simple Games pp. 331-346: Alan D. Taylor and William S. Zwicker
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information.Robert J. Aumann and Michael B. Maschler, with the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns pp. 347-352: Sylvain Sorin

Compensation Principle in Repeated Games pp. 1-21: Kong-Pin Chen
Perceptrons Play Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring pp. 22-53: Inkoo Cho
Auctions with Noncompetitive Sales pp. 54-64: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Dynamics and Rationality in Ordered Externality Games pp. 65-76: Eric J. Friedman
Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade pp. 77-96: Zvika Neeman
A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers pp. 97-108: Akira Okada
Competition in Transactions Mechanisms: The Emergence of Price Competition pp. 109-123: James Peck
On One-Sided versus Two-Sided Matching Games pp. 124-134: Thomas Quint
Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational-Expectations Lindahl Allocations pp. 135-151: Guoqiang Tian

Continuous Stochastic Games of Capital Accumulation with Convex Transitions pp. 111-131: Rabah Amir
Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games pp. 132-148: Rabah Amir
Reserve Prices without Commitment pp. 149-164: Roberto Burguet and József Sákovics
The Split Core for Sequencing Games pp. 165-176: Herbert Hamers, Jeroen Suijs, Stef Tijs and Peter Borm
Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games pp. 177-202: Ebbe Hendon, Hans Jorgen Jacobsen and Birgitte Sloth
Equilibrium Selection inn-Person Coordination Games pp. 203-227: Youngse Kim
The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining pp. 228-254: Xiaohua Lu and Randolph McAfee
Bargaining in the Shadow of Power pp. 255-289: Robert Powell
Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing pp. 290-311: Eric van Damme and Sjaak Hurkens

Case-Based Optimization pp. 1-26: Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler
Virtual Implementation in Backwards Induction pp. 27-32: Jacob Glazer and Motty Perry
Reconsideration-Proofness: A Refinement for Infinite Horizon Time Inconsistency pp. 33-54: Narayana Kocherlakota
A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox pp. 55-81: Jordi Masso
Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting pp. 82-109: Joel Watson

Bargaining Economies with Patient and Impatient Agents: Equilibria and Intermediation pp. 149-172: Gautam Bose
Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions pp. 173-189: Walter Bossert, Ed Nosal and Venkatraman Sadanand
The Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative Wealth pp. 190-207: Arthur Robson
On the Existence of Undominated Nash Equilibria in Normal Form Games pp. 208-219: Hannu Salonen
Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies pp. 220-246: Bernhard von Stengel
Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games pp. 247-259: Daphne Koller, Nimrod Megiddo and Bernhard von Stengel
Bargaining in Uncertain Environments: A Systematic Distortion of Perfect Equilibrium Demands pp. 260-286: Eythan Weg, Rami Zwick and Amnon Rapoport
John Nash's Contribution to Economics pp. 287-295: Roger Myerson
John Harsanyi and the Economics of Information pp. 296-298: Robert Wilson

Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case pp. 1-18: Erwin Amann and Wolfgang Leininger
Another Approach to Mutation and Learning in Games pp. 19-43: Madjid Amir and Siegfried K. Berninghaus
An Exact Formula for the Lion's Share: A Model of Preplay Negotiation pp. 44-89: Bernard Bensaid and Robert Gary-Bobo
Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division pp. 90-123: Francis Bloch
Potential Games pp. 124-143: Dov Monderer and Lloyd Shapley
A2 x 2Game without the Fictitious Play Property pp. 144-148: Dov Monderer and Aner Sela

Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors pp. 141-177: Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni
Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle pp. 178-200: Pierpaolo Battigalli
The Envelope Theorem and Comparative Statics of Nash Equilibria pp. 201-224: Michael Caputo
Cost Sharing under Increasing Returns: A Comparison of Simple Mechanisms pp. 225-251: Herve Moulin
How Much Common Belief Is Necessary for a Convention? pp. 252-268: Hyun Song Shin and Timothy Williamson
On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games pp. 269-285: Alison Watts
On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games pp. 286-300: Quan Wen

Editorial pp. 1-1: Ehud Kalai
Neighborhood Stability in Sender-Receiver Games pp. 2-25: Andreas Blume
An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems pp. 26-38: John Conley and Simon Wilkie
Manipulations by Coalitions Under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Groves Mechanisms pp. 39-73: Jacques Crémer
Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria pp. 74-99: Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs pp. 100-110: John Kagel, Chung Kim and Donald Moser
Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions pp. 111-124: Igal Milchtaich
Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference pp. 125-134: Mehmet Bac and Horst Raff
A Non-constructive Elementary Proof of the Existence of Stable Marriages pp. 135-137: Marilda Sotomayor