Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 73, issue 2, 2011

Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions pp. 301-309

Yaron Azrieli and Dan Levin

Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information pp. 310-317

Yaron Azrieli and Roee Teper

Match-fixing under competitive odds pp. 318-344

Parimal Bag and Bibhas Saha

Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result pp. 345-359

Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno

Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms pp. 360-374

Antonio Cabrales and Roberto Serrano

Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism pp. 375-387

Gorkem Celik and Michael Peters

Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations pp. 388-401

Stefano Comino, Fabio Manenti and Antonio Nicolo'

Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment pp. 402-428

Thomas de Haan, Theo Offerman and Randolph Sloof

Overconfidence and moral hazard pp. 429-451

Leonidas de la Rosa

Generalized Raiffa solutions pp. 452-458

A. Diskin, M. Koppel and Dov Samet

The framing of games and the psychology of play pp. 459-478

Martin Dufwenberg, Simon Gächter and Heike Hennig-Schmidt

Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions pp. 479-495

Gadi Fibich and Nir Gavish

Second best efficiency and the English auction pp. 496-506

Angel Hernando-Veciana and Fabio Michelucci

Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences pp. 507-516

Harold Houba and Quan Wen

Voronoi languages pp. 517-537

Gerhard Jäger, Lars P. Metzger and Frank Riedel

Investment incentives in bilateral trading pp. 538-552

Stephanie Lau

Assignment markets with the same core pp. 553-563

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups pp. 564-572

Dmitry Ryvkin

The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment pp. 573-594

Randolph Sloof and Joep Sonnemans

Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts pp. 595-607

Alexander Wolitzky

Sequentially rationalizable choice with transitive rationales pp. 608-614

Pak Hung Au and Keiichi Kawai

Characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom pp. 615-621

Ezra Einy and Ori Haimanko

Volume 73, issue 1, 2011

Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms pp. 1-16

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Elena Molis

Strategic network formation through peering and service agreements pp. 17-38

Elliot Anshelevich, F.B. Shepherd and Gordon Wilfong

Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems pp. 39-51

Murat Atlamaz, Caroline Berden, Hans Peters and Dries Vermeulen

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values pp. 52-64

Omer Biran and Francoise Forges

Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules pp. 65-75

Daniel Cardona and Clara Ponsati

Network architecture, salience and coordination pp. 76-90

Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv and Thomas Palfrey

Misery loves company: Social regret and social interaction effects in choices under risk and uncertainty pp. 91-110

David Cooper and Mari Rege

Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation pp. 111-135

Jon Eguia

Error cascades in observational learning: An experiment on the Chinos game pp. 136-146

Francesco Feri, Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez, Giovanni Ponti and Fernando Vega-Redondo

English auctions with resale: An experimental study pp. 147-166

Sotiris Georganas

Aggregate information cascades pp. 167-185

Antonio Guarino, Heike Harmgart and Steffen Huck

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence pp. 186-199

Eva Hoppe and Patrick Schmitz

The high/low divide: Self-selection by values in auction choice pp. 200-214

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Tim Salmon

Inequality and network structure pp. 215-226

Willemien Kets, Garud Iyengar, Rajiv Sethi and Samuel Bowles

Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: Theory and application pp. 227-235

Akira Okada

Sequential auctions with randomly arriving buyers pp. 236-243

Maher Said

Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness pp. 244-261

Marta Serra-Garcia, Eric van Damme and Jan Potters

Fictitious play in 3x3 games: Chaos and dithering behaviour pp. 262-286

Sebastian van Strien and Colin Sparrow

On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors pp. 287-295

Yves Guéron, Thibaut Lamadon and Caroline Thomas

Choosing and sharing pp. 296-300

Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti and Justin Leroux

Volume 72, issue 2, 2011

A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences pp. 321-338

Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann and Hans-Theo Normann

Social interactions and spillovers pp. 339-360

Antonio Cabrales, Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Yves Zenou

Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game pp. 361-375

Gary Charness, Ninghua Du and Chun-Lei Yang

Bargaining or searching for a better price? - An experimental study pp. 376-399

Francesco Feri and Anita Gantner

Social distance in a virtual world experiment pp. 400-426

Marina Fiedler, Ernan Haruvy and Sherry Li

On Chinese postman games where residents of each road pay the cost of their road pp. 427-438

Daniel Granot, Herbert Hamers, Jeroen Kuipers and Michael Maschler

Framing effects in public goods: Prospect Theory and experimental evidence pp. 439-447

Inigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Giovanni Ponti, Josefa Tomás and Luis Ubeda

Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment pp. 448-451

Maciej Kotowski

On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations pp. 452-466

Christoph Kuzmics

On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness pp. 467-484

Jordi Masso and Inés Moreno de Barreda

Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees pp. 485-509

Rebecca Morton and Jean-Robert Tyran

An algorithm for proper rationalizability pp. 510-525

Andrés Perea

One-dimensional bargaining pp. 526-543

Arkadi Predtetchinski

Bilateral trading with naive traders pp. 544-557

Rene Saran

An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values pp. 558-573

Quazi Shahriar and John Wooders

Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable pp. 574-582

Artyom Shneyerov and Chi Leung Wong

On auction protocols for decentralized scheduling pp. 583-585

Nicholas G. Hall and Zhixin Liu

Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections pp. 586-593

Patrick Hummel

Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note pp. 594-601

Maarten Janssen, Vladimir Karamychev and Emiel Maasland

Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders pp. 602-606

Ryuji Sano

Volume 72, issue 1, 2011

Derandomization of auctions pp. 1-11

Gagan Aggarwal, Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica and Madhu Sudan

Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties pp. 12-29

Sophie Bade

Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity pp. 30-37

Ulrich Berger

Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders pp. 38-45

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Sayantan Ghosal

Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes pp. 46-76

Alessandra Casella

Gender differences in cooperation with group membership pp. 77-85

Gary Charness and Aldo Rustichini

Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal pp. 86-99

Drew Fudenberg and Wojciech Olszewski

How to talk to multiple audiences pp. 100-122

Maria Goltsman and Gregory Pavlov

Influence functions, followers and command games pp. 123-138

Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska

The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions pp. 139-148

Thomas Gresik

Centralizing information in networks pp. 149-162

Jeanne Hagenbach

Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors pp. 163-171

Ziv Hellman

Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets pp. 172-186

Bettina Klaus

Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction pp. 187-201

Masahiro Kumabe and H. Reiju Mihara

Networks of relations and Word-of-Mouth Communication pp. 202-217

Steffen Lippert and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions pp. 218-241

Vlad Mares and Jeroen M. Swinkels

Group strategyproofness in queueing models pp. 242-254

Manipushpak Mitra and Suresh Mutuswami

Intertemporal choice and the magnitude effect pp. 255-270

Jawwad Noor

Potential games in volatile environments pp. 271-287

Mathias Staudigl

Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games pp. 288-300

Jonathan Weinstein and Muhamet Yildiz

A robustness result for rationalizable implementation pp. 301-305

Alfredo Di Tillio

Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms pp. 306-313

Toshihiro Matsumura and Noriaki Matsushima

Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints pp. 314-320

Herve Moulin and Francois Laigret