Group robust stability in matching markets
Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 394-398
We introduce the notion of group robust stability which requires robustness against a combined manipulation, first misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first result shows that there is no group robustly stable mechanism even under acyclic priority structures. Next, we define a weak version of group robust stability, called weak group robust stability. Our main theorem, then, proves that there is a weakly group robustly stable mechanism if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic, and in that case, it coincides with the student-optimal stable mechanism.
Keywords: Matching; Stability; Group robust stability; Group strategy-proofness; Acyclicity; Combined manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 D78 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:394-398
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