Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

Olivier Bochet () and Sidartha Gordon ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 52-67

Abstract: A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among “interest groups”. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Keywords: Multiple public facilities; Priority rules; Hierarchical rules; Object-population monotonicity; Sovereignty; Strategy-proofness; Generalized median voter rules; No-show paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D63 D70 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities (2008)
Working Paper: Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:52-67

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.002

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