Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan () and Tristan Tomala

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 222-234

Abstract: This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Keywords: Cheap-talk; Communication equilibrium; Normal-form correlated equilibrium; Distributed computation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (2012)
Working Paper: Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:222-234

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002

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