Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Tristan Tomala, Yuval Heller and Eilon Solan (eilons@post.tau.ac.il)

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Abstract: This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Keywords: Cheap-talk; Communication equilibrium; Normal-form correlated equilibrium; Distributed computation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74 (1), pp.222-234. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (2012)
Working Paper: Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00715606

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.002

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