Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan and Tristan Tomala

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

Keywords: correlated equilbirium; distributed computation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54905/1/MPRA_paper_25895.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (2012)
Working Paper: Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:25895

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