Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures

Siyang Xiong

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 442-446

Abstract: Given the regularity condition on posteriors proposed in Lehrer and Samet (2011), we show that Lehrer and Sametʼs (2011) characterization of agreeing to agree in countable-information models cannot be extended to uncountable-information models. This answers an open question raised in Lehrer and Samet (2011).

Keywords: Common knowledge; Common prior; Posterior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:442-446

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.012

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