Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation

Célestin Nembua ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 431-433

Abstract: Recently, Hermandez-Lamoneda et al. (2008) and independently Chameni and Andjiga (2008) gave an analytic formulation for all valued solutions to the n-person TU-games that satisfy linearity, efficiency and symmetry axioms. Our main purpose in this paper is to recast the proposed formulation to a more potentially interpretational one. We are focused on an interpretation based on the idea of marginal contribution, a concept already familiar in the Shapley value and the Solidarity value. A general null player axiom is introduced, and it turns out that any valued solution satisfying the three properties is characterized by a null player model.

Keywords: TU-games; Single valued solution; Shapley value; Marginal contribution; Null player axiom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D46 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Working Paper: Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:431-433

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.003

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