Ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria of large games

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 418-430

Abstract: We present a result on approximate ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria in semi-anonymous Bayesian games with a large finite number of players. The result allows playersʼ action and type spaces to be general compact metric spaces, thus extending a result by Kalai (2004).

Keywords: Bayes–Nash equilibrium; Large games; Ex-post stability; Concentration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:418-430

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.005

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