When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds

Vikram Manjunath

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 2, 576-587

Abstract: We study the problem of rationing a divisible good among a group of people. Each personʼs preferences are characterized by an ideal amount that he would prefer to receive and a minimum quantity that he will accept: any amount less than this threshold is just as good as receiving nothing at all. Any amount beyond his ideal quantity has no effect on his welfare.

Keywords: Pareto-efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Fairness; Rationing; Lower-bounds; Sequential priority rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:2:p:576-587

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.012

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