EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma

Toshimasa Maruta and Akira Okada

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 269-284

Abstract: We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisonerʼs dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process of voluntary participation. We prove that a cooperating group forms as an absorbing state of a Markov perfect equilibrium after a finite number of renegotiations if and only if the group is Pareto efficient, provided that individuals are patient. The cooperating group can only expand.

Keywords: Group formation; Prisonerʼs dilemma; Repeated games; Non-cooperative coalitional bargaining; Efficiency; Renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825611000911
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:269-284

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().

 
Page updated 2019-11-09
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:269-284