The Herodotus paradox

Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 399-406

Abstract: The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the “Herodotus paradox.”

Keywords: Auctions; Contests; Mixed strategy; Interim equilibrium; Ex ante equilibrium; Fubiniʼs Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Herodotus Paradox (2010)
Working Paper: The Herodotus Paradox (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:399-406

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.004

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