The Herodotus Paradox

Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries

No 2010-16, Working Papers from Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the “Herodotus Paradox.”

JEL-codes: C72 D44 L0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://kelley.iu.edu/riharbau/RePEc/iuk/wpaper/bep ... kovenock-devries.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Herodotus paradox (2012)
Working Paper: The Herodotus Paradox (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2010-16

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