The Herodotus Paradox

Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper De Vries and de Vries Casper G
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Casper G. de Vries

No 3135, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the “Herodotus Paradox.”

JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Herodotus paradox (2012)
Working Paper: The Herodotus Paradox (2010)
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