The Herodotus Paradox

Michael Baye, Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries

No 10-090/2, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior' , 74(1), 399-406.

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete information, and in so doing identify what we call the "Herodotus Paradox".

Keywords: second price; transfer to loser (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Herodotus paradox (2012)
Working Paper: The Herodotus Paradox (2010)
Working Paper: The Herodotus Paradox (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100090

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