Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Mini special issue: Electronic Market Design pp. 213-214: Eric van Damme, Rudolf Müller and Rakesh V. Vohra
Ascending price Vickrey auctions pp. 215-241: Sushil Bikhchandani and Joseph Ostroy
Competitive auctions pp. 242-269: Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Michael Saks and Andrew Wright
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities pp. 270-296: Benny Lehmann, Daniel Lehmann and Noam Nisan
Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction pp. 297-320: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin Roth
Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets pp. 321-330: Tuomas Sandholm and Subhash Suri
Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power pp. 331-339: Jean-Pierre Benoit and Efe Ok
A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information pp. 340-371: Juin-Kuan Chong, Colin F. Camerer and Teck Ho
Efficient priority rules pp. 372-384: Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus
Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations--The anonymous case pp. 385-406: Rann Smorodinsky and Moshe Tennenholtz

Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly pp. 1-20: Rabah Amir and Anna Stepanova
The evolution of focal points pp. 21-42: Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson
Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty pp. 43-71: Maria-Angeles de Frutos and Lambros Pechlivanos
Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices pp. 72-99: Katsushige Fujimoto, Ivan Kojadinovic and Jean-Luc Marichal
Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem pp. 100-111: Julio González-Díaz
Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution pp. 112-130: Daniel Hojman and Adam Szeidl
Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions pp. 131-151: Bernard Lebrun
Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing pp. 152-188: Herve Moulin and Yves Sprumont
Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information pp. 189-206: Charles Noussair and Jonathon Silver

Asymmetric rules for claims problems without homogeneity pp. 241-260: Christopher Chambers
Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games pp. 261-292: Martin Dindos and Claudio Mezzetti
A theory of reciprocity pp. 293-315: Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher
Dynamic yardstick mechanisms pp. 316-335: A. Faure-Grimaud and S. Reiche
Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games pp. 336-352: Douglas Gale and Hamid Sabourian
Network formation with heterogeneous players pp. 353-372: Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal and Jurjen Kamphorst
The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games pp. 373-379: Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels
Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games pp. 380-397: Maria Montero
Allocation problems among sharing groups pp. 398-418: Sangkyu Rhee
A note on a value with incomplete communication pp. 419-429: J.M. Bilbao, N. Jimenez and J.J. Lopez
Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto pp. 430-440: Christopher Chambers and Takashi Hayashi

Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism pp. 1-24: Christopher M. Anderson and Louis Putterman
The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note pp. 25-30: Anindya Bhattacharya and Abderrahmane Ziad
Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry pp. 31-46: Indranil Chakraborty
Approval voting with endogenous candidates pp. 47-76: Arnaud Dellis and Mandar Oak
Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games pp. 77-94: Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko and Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games pp. 95-114: Jim Engle-Warnick and Robert Slonim
Parametric rationing methods pp. 115-133: Marek M. Kaminski
An experimental study of price dispersion pp. 134-158: John Morgan, Henrik Orzen and Martin Sefton
Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining pp. 159-182: Charles H. Mullin and David Reiley
Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets pp. 183-204: Tibor Neugebauer and Reinhard Selten
The nucleolus of balanced simple flow networks pp. 205-225: Jos Potters, Hans Reijnierse and Amit Biswas
The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies pp. 226-240: Abraham L. Wickelgren

Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games pp. 151-169: Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin
Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions pp. 170-207: John Kagel and Dan Levin
A folk theorem for minority games pp. 208-230: Jérôme Renault, Sergio Scarlatti and Marco Scarsini
Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information pp. 231-247: Satoru Takahashi
Axiomatization of the core of assignment games pp. 248-261: Manabu Toda
Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory pp. 262-268: Eduardo Zambrano
B. Peleg and P. Sudholter, Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games, Kluwer Academic, Boston (2003) ISBN 1-4020-7410-7 378 pages pp. 269-270: Michael Maschler

Ordinal versus cardinal complementarity: The case of Cournot oligopoly pp. 1-14: Rabah Amir
Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games pp. 15-42: Geir Asheim and Andrés Perea
Distributing awards efficiently: More on King Solomon's problem pp. 43-58: Parimal Bag and Hamid Sabourian
Finite memory and imperfect monitoring pp. 59-72: Harold Cole and Narayana Kocherlakota
Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example pp. 73-82: Geoffroy de Clippel
Evolution in Bayesian games I: Theory pp. 83-109: Jeffrey Ely and William Sandholm
Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning pp. 110-125: Ed Hopkins and Martin Posch
Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria pp. 126-140: George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
Fee versus royalty reconsidered pp. 141-147: Debapriya Sen