Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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On coalitional semivalues pp. 221-243: M. Josune Albizuri and José Zarzuelo
Stochastic imitation in finite games pp. 244-259: Jens Josephson and Alexander Matros
Best response equivalence pp. 260-287: Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
A model of the origins of basic property rights pp. 288-312: Abhinay Muthoo
Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring pp. 313-344: Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala
Efficient spatial competition pp. 345-362: Harborne Stuart
Program equilibrium pp. 363-373: Moshe Tennenholtz
The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs pp. 374-400: Felix Vardy
An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs pp. 401-423: John Morgan and Felix Vardy
Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation pp. 424-434: Pablo Amoros

NP-completeness in hedonic games pp. 1-30: Coralio Ballester
A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index pp. 31-48: Rana Barua, Satya Chakravarty, Sonali Roy and Palash Sarkar
Dynamic interactive epistemology pp. 49-80: Oliver Board
Non-excludable public good experiments pp. 81-102: Timothy Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takehiko Yamato and Konomu Yokotani
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems pp. 103-116: Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining pp. 117-134: Aviad Heifetz and Ella Segev
Rationalizability for social environments pp. 135-156: P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule pp. 157-170: Özgür Kıbrıs
Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations pp. 171-214: Mark Stegeman and Paul Rhode
Reviews and Comments pp. 215-219: Benny Moldovanu

Stochastic stability in a double auction pp. 203-222: Murali Agastya
Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games pp. 223-248: Bhaskar Dutta and Anirban Kar
In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm pp. 249-270: Lars Ehlers
Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs pp. 271-291: Roland Hain and Manipushpak Mitra
Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games pp. 292-320: Frederic Koessler
Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information pp. 321-336: Christoph Kuzmics
Unique stability in simple coalition formation games pp. 337-354: Szilvia Pápai
Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views pp. 355-384: Philip Reny and Arthur Robson
On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response pp. 385-402: Makoto Shimoji
Preparation pp. 403-414: Mark Voorneveld

Restabilizing matching markets at senior level pp. 1-17: David Cantala
Random paths to stability in the roommate problem pp. 18-28: Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eiichi Miyagawa and Licun Xue
Successful uninformed bidding pp. 29-53: Angel Hernando-Veciana
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations pp. 54-85: Oliver Kirchkamp and Benny Moldovanu
The coalition structure core is accessible pp. 86-93: László Kóczy and Luc Lauwers
Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation pp. 94-110: Nikolai Kukushkin
Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments pp. 111-123: Suresh Mutuswami, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein
Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents pp. 124-138: David Myatt and Chris Wallace
Bargaining with an agenda pp. 139-153: Barry O'Neill, Dov Samet, Zvi Wiener and Eyal Winter
Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies pp. 154-170: James Schummer
Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games pp. 171-200: Marco Slikker and Henk Norde

Memory and perfect recall in extensive games pp. 237-256: Giacomo Bonanno
On weighted Kalai-Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games pp. 257-267: Youngsub Chun
A theory of sequential reciprocity pp. 268-298: Martin Dufwenberg and Georg Kirchsteiger
Bribing and signaling in second price auctions pp. 299-324: Peter Eso and James Schummer
An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow pp. 325-352: Eric Friedman, Mikhael Shor, Scott Shenker and Barry Sopher
Random-player games pp. 353-388: Igal Milchtaich
Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games pp. 389-403: Tim Roughgarden and Eva Tardos
Endogenous price leadership pp. 404-420: Eric van Damme and Sjaak Hurkens
Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity pp. 421-452: Andreas Westermark
Erratum to "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games": [Games Econ. Behav. 46 (2004) 240-259] pp. 453-453: Andreas Blume and Tone Arnold

Aggregation and the law of large numbers in large economies pp. 1-35: Nabil I. Al-Najjar
Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing pp. 36-71: Aaron Archer, Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami and Scott Shenker
Observational learning under imperfect information pp. 72-86: Boğaçhan Çelen and Shachar Kariv
Characterization of ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions pp. 87-103: Ron Holzman and Dov Monderer
Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions pp. 104-123: Ron Holzman, Noa Kfir-Dahav, Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz
Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals pp. 124-156: Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala
Belief-based equilibrium pp. 157-171: Alvaro Sandroni and Rann Smorodinsky
Games with espionage pp. 172-199: Eilon Solan and Leeat Yariv
Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game pp. 200-220: Ran Spiegler
Individually rational pure strategies in large games pp. 221-233: William Stanford