Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 146, issue C, 2024

Voter coordination in elections: A case for approval voting pp. 1-34

François Durand, Antonin Macé and Matías Núñez

The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian uncertainty pp. 35-50

Gerrit Bauch and Frank Riedel

Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets pp. 51-58

Esteban Peralta

Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses pp. 59-76

Duk Gyoo Kim and Wooyoung Lim

Aggregating inconclusive data sets pp. 77-90

Gabrielle Gayer, Ehud Lehrer and Dotan Persitz

On the manipulability of allocation rules through endowment augmentation pp. 91-104

William Thomson

Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements pp. 105-120

Kalyan Chatterjee and Rakesh Chaturvedi

Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market pp. 121-136

Helmut Bester

Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs pp. 137-159

Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Xavier Venel and Anna Zseleva

Belief formation under signal correlation pp. 160-183

Tanjim Hossain and Ryo Okui

Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies pp. 184-195

Nabil Afodjo and Roland Pongou

Differentiating roles of the reference alternative pp. 196-221

Dan Qin

Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types pp. 222-233

Ori Haimanko

Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets pp. 234-254

Di Feng, Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn

How alliances form and conflict ensues pp. 255-276

Lu Dong, Lingbo Huang, Jaimie W. Lien and Jie Zheng

Capacity design in school choice pp. 277-291

Mustafa Oğuz Afacan, Umut Dur and Martin Van der Linden

Social learning with partial and aggregate information: Experimental evidence pp. 292-307

Elisa Cavatorta, Antonio Guarino and Steffen Huck

Posted offers with charitable promises: True preferences and strategic behavior pp. 308-326

Claudia Schwirplies and Andreas Lange

Volume 145, issue C, 2024

Two experiments on trading information goods in a network pp. 1-18

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Yutaka Kayaba, Jun Maekawa and Hitoshi Matsushima

An undecidable statement regarding zero-sum games pp. 19-26

Mark Fey

Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital pp. 27-53

Mathieu V. Leduc

Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition pp. 54-65

Yanlin Chen, Audrey Hu and Jun Zhang

Efficiency wages with motivated agents pp. 66-83

Jesper Armouti-Hansen, Lea Cassar, Anna Deréky and Florian Engl

Equilibrium information in credence goods pp. 84-101

Ting Liu and Ching-to Ma

Bayesian stable states pp. 102-116

Yi-Chun Chen and Gaoji Hu

Hidden in plain sight: Payoffs, probability, space, and time in isomorphic tasks pp. 117-136

Sean M. Collins and Duncan James

On common evaluation standards and the acceptance of wage inequality pp. 137-156

Peter Werner

Entry under placement uncertainty pp. 157-196

Sunanda Roy, Rajesh Singh and Quinn Weninger

Efficient matching under general constraints pp. 197-207

Kenzo Imamura and Yasushi Kawase

Voting to persuade pp. 208-216

Tsz-Ning Wong, Lily Ling Yang and Xin Zhao

Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains pp. 217-238

Péter Biró and Gergely Csáji

Best-response dynamics in two-person random games with correlated payoffs pp. 239-262

Hlafo Alfie Mimun, Matteo Quattropani and Marco Scarsini

Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction pp. 263-284

Huiyi Guo

Relative performance evaluation in spillover networks pp. 285-311

Yang Sun and Wei Zhao

Experimental evidence on the relationship between perceived ambiguity and likelihood insensitivity pp. 312-338

Luca Henkel

Information avoidance in school choice pp. 339-355

Paola Moscariello

Information flows and memory in games pp. 356-376

Pierpaolo Battigalli and Nicolò Generoso

Myopic oligopoly pricing pp. 377-412

Iwan Bos, Marco Marini and Riccardo D. Saulle

Auction design with heterogeneous priors pp. 413-425

Hien Pham and Takuro Yamashita

Maximal Condorcet domains. A further progress report pp. 426-450

Clemens Puppe and Arkadii Slinko

Who's the deceiver? Identifying deceptive intentions in communication pp. 451-466

Juan Francisco Blazquiz-Pulido, Luca Polonio and Ennio Bilancini

Contests within and between groups: Theory and experiment pp. 467-492

Puja Bhattacharya and Jeevant Rampal

Identity change and economic mobility: Experimental evidence pp. 493-509

Manuel Muñoz

Oddness of the number of Nash equilibria: The case of polynomial payoff functions pp. 510-525

Philippe Bich and Julien Fixary

Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests pp. 526-556

Stefano Barbieri and Marco Serena

Volume 144, issue C, 2024

Cournot meets Bayes-Nash: A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games pp. 1-12

Cédric Argenton, Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Wieland Müller

A stranger in a strange land: Promises and identity pp. 13-28

Gary Charness, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo and Stefano Papa

Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning pp. 29-48

Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova

A fair and truthful mechanism with limited subsidy pp. 49-70

Hiromichi Goko, Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase, Kazuhisa Makino, Hanna Sumita, Akihisa Tamura, Yu Yokoi and Makoto Yokoo

Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores pp. 71-83

Ross Rheingans-Yoo

Reinforcement learning in a prisoner's dilemma pp. 84-103

Arthur Dolgopolov

Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines pp. 104-125

Ata Atay and Christian Trudeau

Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On Rationalizability in games with private values pp. 126-140

Enrico De Magistris

Dynamic coordination with payoff and informational externalities pp. 141-166

Beixi Zhou

Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity pp. 167-182

Ran I. Shorrer and Sándor Sóvágó

Partnerships based on Joint Ownership pp. 183-202

Matthias Blonski and Daniel Herbold

Impartial selection with additive guarantees via iterated deletion pp. 203-224

Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, David Hannon and Max Klimm

Learning in networks with idiosyncratic agents pp. 225-249

Vatsal Khandelwal

Shining with the stars: Competition, screening, and concern for coworkers' quality pp. 250-283

Francesca Barigozzi and Helmuth Cremer

Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation pp. 284-299

Ninghua Du and Quazi Shahriar

Popular matchings with weighted voters pp. 300-328

Klaus Heeger and Ágnes Cseh

The impact of fraud on reputation systems pp. 329-354

Jan Philipp Krügel and Fabian Paetzel

Multi-dimensional reasoning in competitive resource allocation games: Evidence from intra-team communication pp. 355-377

Ayala Arad and Stefan P. Penczynski

Beyond dominance and Nash: Ranking equilibria by critical mass pp. 378-394

Adam Tauman Kalai and Ehud Kalai