How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment

David Gill, Zachary Knepper, Victoria Prowse and Junya Zhou

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 149, issue C, 82-95

Abstract: We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelligence is a primary driver of strategic level-k thinking, while facets of judgment that are distinct from fluid intelligence drive the lower inclination of high judgment individuals to choose zero.

Keywords: Cognitive ability; Judgment; Fluid intelligence; Matrix reasoning; Beauty contest; Strategic sophistication; Level-k; Experiment; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825624001398
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:149:y:2025:i:c:p:82-95

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.007

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().