 A recursive measure of voting power that satisfies reasonable postulatesArash Abizadeh and Adrian Vetta Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 148, issue C, 535-565 Abstract: The classical measures of voting power are based on players' decisiveness or full causal efficacy in vote configurations or divisions. We design an alternative, recursive measure departing from this classical approach. We motivate the measure via an axiomatic characterisation based on reasonable axioms and by offering two complementary interpretations of its meaning: first, we interpret the measure to represent, not the player's probability of being decisive in a voting structure, but its expected probability of being decisive in a uniform random walk from a vote configuration in the subset lattice (through which we represent the voting structure); and, second, we interpret it as representing a player's expected efficacy, thereby incorporating the notion of partial and not just full causal efficacy. We shore up our measure by demonstrating that it satisfies a set of postulates any reasonable voting measure should satisfy, namely, the iso-invariance, dummy, dominance, donation, minimum-power bloc, and quarrel postulates. Keywords: Measures of voting power; Voting power postulates; Simple voting games; Random walks; Subset lattice (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:535-565 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.001 Access Statistics for this article Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.