A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

Agustín Bonifacio, E. Inarra and P. Neme

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 148, issue C, 1-22

Abstract: Given a standard myopic process in a coalition formation game, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of coalition structures that is never left once entered through this process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a “reduced form” of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Absorbing set; Reduced form of a game; Convergence to stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:1-22

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.014

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