Stable decompositions of coalition formation games

Agustín Bonifacio (), Elena Inarra and Pablo Neme ()

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: It is known that a coalition formation game may not have a stable coalition structure. In this study we propose a new solution concept for these games, which we call "stable decomposition", and show that each game has at least one. This solution consists of a collection of coalitions organized in sets that "protect" each other in a stable way. When sets of this collection are singletons, the stable decomposition can be identified with a stable coalition structure. As an application, we study convergence to stability in coalition formation games.

Date: 2020-09, Revised 2021-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-gth
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2009.11689 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Stable Decompositions of Coalition Formation Games (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2009.11689

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