A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games

Agustín Bonifacio, Elena Inarra and Pablo Neme

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Given a standard myopic dynamic process among coalition structures, an absorbing set is a minimal collection of such structures that is never left once entered through that process. Absorbing sets are an important solution concept in coalition formation games, but they have drawbacks: they can be large and hard to obtain. In this paper, we characterize an absorbing set in terms of a collection consisting of a small number of sets of coalitions that we refer to as a "reduced form" of a game. We apply our characterization to study convergence to stability in several economic environments.

Date: 2020-09, Revised 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-gth
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Journal Article: A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2009.11689

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