Stability vs. no justified envy

Assaf Romm, Alvin Roth and Ran I. Shorrer

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 148, issue C, 357-366

Abstract: Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:148:y:2024:i:c:p:357-366

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002

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