Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function

Shigehiro Serizawa and John Weymark

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 149, issue C, 164-169

Abstract: For the provision of m≥1 divisible public goods, relatively weak restrictions on the domain of a strategy-proof social choice function are identified that ensure that its range is bounded. Domain restrictions are also identified for which strategy-proofness implies that the range and the option sets of a social choice function are compact. To illustrate the usefulness of these results, it is shown how a theorem about generalized median voter schemes due to Barberà, Massó, and Serizawa can be established without their assumption that the range of a social choice function is compact provided that the tops of the preferences are not restricted to be finite.

Keywords: Strategy-proof social choice; Option sets; Additively separable preferences; Single-peaked preferences; Generalized median voter schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:149:y:2025:i:c:p:164-169

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.013

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