Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems

Oihane Gallo and Bettina Klaus ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 147, issue C, 485-516

Abstract: We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size θ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses rule (CEL). For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable partitions with (mostly) θ-size coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide algorithms to construct such a stable partition formed by (mostly) θ-size coalitions.

Keywords: Claims problems; Coalition formation; Stable partitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D63 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems (2024)
Working Paper: Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:147:y:2024:i:c:p:485-516

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.011

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