Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems

Kristóf Bérczi, Gergely Csáji and Tamás Király

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 147, issue C, 407-428

Abstract: The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet certain requirements. In such cases, one might be interested in modifying the instance so that the existence of a stable outcome with the desired properties is ensured. We focus on three different modifications.

Keywords: Inverse optimization; Preference completion; Stable matching; Stable roommates problem; Vertex deletion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:147:y:2024:i:c:p:407-428

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.010

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