Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?

Linnéa Marie Rohde

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 147, issue C, 305-337

Abstract: An election with full turnout is supposed to achieve an outcome that perfectly reflects the majority's preference. This result requires voters to be perfectly informed about their preferences and to vote accordingly. I show that incentivizing participation with an abstention fine does not necessarily incentivize information acquisition. While a small abstention fine always increases information acquisition compared to Voluntary Voting, a high abstention fine that achieves full turnout increases information acquisition only if voting costs are high. If voting costs are low, the opposite is true: Less individuals acquire information under Compulsory Voting with full turnout than under Voluntary Voting.

Keywords: Costly voting; Costly information acquisition; Mandatory voting; Compulsory voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:147:y:2024:i:c:p:305-337

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.005

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