Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions

Florian Diekert and Tillmann Eymess

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 147, issue C, 388-406

Abstract: Nudges are widely used and a broad literature documents that they successfully affect individual behavior. However, in most settings where nudges are needed to change collective action, teams – not individuals – determine outcomes. Because team decision making is pervasive, learning whether nudges work with teams in social dilemmas is important, especially when formal enforcement is difficult. Here, we show that a nudge increases team cooperation by 14 to 16 percentage points in a social dilemma among fishing crews at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The nudge is particularly effective when team decisions are made by a team member with leadership experience. Our findings are a proof of concept that expands the toolkit of empirical researchers and policy makers that address social dilemmas among teams.

Keywords: Collective action; Team decisions; Nudges; Common pool resources (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 D91 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:147:y:2024:i:c:p:388-406

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.009

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