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Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games

Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng and Yuhao Li

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 149, issue C, 118-147

Abstract: Stackelberg equilibrium describes the optimal strategies of a player, when she (the leader) first credibly commits to a strategy. Her opponent (the follower) will best respond to her commitment. To compute the optimal commitment, a leader must learn enough follower's payoff information. The follower can then potentially provide fake information, to induce a different final game outcome that benefits him more than when he truthfully behaves.

Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium; Strategic behavior; Private information manipulation; Extensive-form games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:149:y:2025:i:c:p:118-147

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.008

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