Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games pp. 173-183: Sandeep Baliga
On Non-Nash Equilibria pp. 184-203: Mario Gilli
Finite Horizon Bargaining and the Consistent Field pp. 204-228: Armando Gomes, Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
Combinatorial Games under Auction Play pp. 229-264: Andrew J. Lazarus, Daniel E. Loeb, James G. Propp, Walter R. Stromquist and Daniel H. Ullman
Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures pp. 265-298: Salvatore Modica and Aldo Rustichini
Distributive and Additive Costsharing of an Homogeneous Good pp. 299-330: Herve Moulin and Scott Shenker
Stochastic Cooperative Games: Superadditivity, Convexity, and Certainty Equivalents pp. 331-345: Jeroen Suijs and Peter Borm

Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games pp. 1-37: Luca Anderlini
Interactive Implementation pp. 38-63: Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom
A Nonparametric, Efficient Public Good Decision Mechanism: Undominated Bayesian Implementation pp. 64-85: Jaewon Choi and Taesung Kim
An Empirical Model of Strategic Choice with an Application to Coordination Games pp. 86-105: Debra J. Holt
Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices pp. 106-113: Klaus Kultti
Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information pp. 114-131: Deborah Minehart and Suzanne Scotchmer
Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations pp. 132-152: Noritsugu Nakanishi
A [beta]-Core Existence Result and Its Application to Oligopoly Markets pp. 153-168: Jingang Zhao

Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects pp. 193-220: Sushil Bikhchandani
The Ultimatum Game: Optimal Strategies without Fairness pp. 221-252: Stephen Burnell, Lewis Evans and Shuntian Yao
Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance pp. 253-278: Leslie Marx
A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma pp. 279-285: Motty Perry and Philip Reny
A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures pp. 286-336: Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra
Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation pp. 337-352: Tomas Sjostrom
On the Coalition-Proofness of the Pareto Frontier of the Set of Nash Equilibria pp. 353-364: Sang-Seung Yi

Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium pp. 1-21: Rabah Amir and Isabel Grilo
After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment pp. 22-39: Gianni De Fraja
Endogenous Formation of Coalitions in Noncooperative Games pp. 40-58: José Luis Ferreira
A Value with Incomplete Communication pp. 59-78: Gerard Hamiache
Learning, Matching, and Aggregation pp. 79-110: Ed Hopkins
Generic 4 x 4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria pp. 111-130: Andrew McLennan and In-Uck Park
Social Learning in a Common Interest Voting Game pp. 131-156: Jorgen Wit
A Payoff Uncertainty Explanation of Results in Experimental Centipede Games pp. 157-185: Klaus Zauner
On Bargaining for an Indivisible Good pp. 186-192: Rodney Garratt

Introduction pp. 147-148: Claude d'Aspremont
Regulation of a Risk Averse Firm pp. 149-173: Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Rochet
Contracts and Productive Information Gathering pp. 174-193: Jacques Crémer, Fahad Khalil and Jean Rochet
Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency pp. 194-218: Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton
A Model of Efficient Discovery pp. 219-250: Robert Mnookin and Robert Wilson
Economic Dynasties with Intermissions pp. 251-271: Louis Gevers and Philippe Michel
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges pp. 272-291: Salvador Barberà, Jordi Masso and Shigehiro Serizawa
Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games pp. 292-310: Francoise Forges and Enrico Minelli
Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview pp. 311-336: Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Reinterpreting Arbitration's Narcotic Effect: An Experimental Study of Learning in Repeated Bargaining pp. 1-33: Gary Bolton and Elena Katok
Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions pp. 34-78: Kay-Yut Chen and Charles Plott
On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games pp. 79-96: Dean Foster and H. Young
Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions pp. 97-110: Bernard Lebrun
Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem pp. 111-131: Roger Myerson
On the Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities: A Note pp. 132-143: Kaoru Ueda

An Incomplete Cooperation Structure for a Voting Game Can Be Strategically Stable pp. 2-9: Yossi Feinberg
Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining pp. 10-24: Kevin McCabe, Stephen Rassenti and Vernon Smith
Vector Measure Games Based on Measures with Values in an Infinite Dimensional Vector Space pp. 25-46: Igal Milchtaich
An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games pp. 47-76: Diego Moreno and John Wooders
The -Nucleolus of TU-Games pp. 77-96: Hans Reijnierse and Jos Potters
Naive Adaptive Behavior and the Observability of Gambles pp. 97-108: Arthur Robson
The Family of Least Square Values for Transferable Utility Games pp. 109-130: Luis M. Ruiz, Federico Valenciano and José Zarzuelo
Iterated Expectations and Common Priors pp. 131-141: Dov Samet
Axiomatizations of Game Theoretical Solutions for One-Output Cost Sharing Problems pp. 142-171: Peter Sudhölter
Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets pp. 172-174: Dov Samet
Counter-Counterfactuals pp. 175-180: Itzhak Gilboa
On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann pp. 181-210: Eric van Damme