Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 41, issue 2, 2002

The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements pp. 169-191

Lutz-Alexander Busch and Ignatius Horstmann

Welfare reducing licensing pp. 192-205

Ramon Fauli-Oller and Joel Sandonis

How to play with a biased coin? pp. 206-226

Olivier Gossner and Nicolas Vieille

Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction pp. 227-264

Sergiu Hart

On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games pp. 265-291

Matthew Jackson and Alison Watts

Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions pp. 292-308

Eiichi Miyagawa

Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel pp. 309-321

Maria Montero

A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme pp. 322-343

Henk Norde and Hans Reijnierse

Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets pp. 344-364

Karl Wärneryd

Volume 41, issue 1, 2002

The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study pp. 1-25

Gary Bornstein, Uri Gneezy and Rosemarie Nagel

Fairness and learning: an experimental examination pp. 26-45

David Cooper and Carol Kraker Stockman

On (un)knots and dynamics in games pp. 46-60

Stefano Demichelis and Fabrizio Germano

Probabilistic choice and procedurally bounded rationality pp. 61-78

Lars-Göran Mattsson and Jörgen Weibull

Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions pp. 79-102

Robert Samuel Simon

Calibration and Bayesian learning pp. 103-119

Nurlan Turdaliev

On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes pp. 120-140

Oscar Volij and Eyal Winter

Eliciting information from multiple experts pp. 141-160

Asher Wolinsky

A note on k-price auctions with complete information pp. 161-164

Yair Tauman

Corrigendum to "Bargaining and boldness": [Games Econ. Behav. 38 (2002) 28-51] pp. 165-168

Albert Burgos, Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii

Volume 40, issue 2, 2002

An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection pp. 153-184

Ana Ania, Thomas Troger and Achim Wambach

Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? pp. 185-202

Walter Bossert, Steven Brams and D. Marc Kilgour

Altruism, equity, and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: an encompassing approach pp. 203-231

Gary Charness and Ernan Haruvy

Endogenous fluctuations under evolutionary pressure in Cournot competition pp. 232-269

Edward Droste, Cars Hommes and Jan Tuinstra

A myopic adjustment process leading to best-reply matching pp. 270-298

Michael Kosfeld, Edward Droste and Mark Voorneveld

Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring pp. 299-321

Tadashi Sekiguchi

A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games pp. 322-338

Andrés Perea

Volume 40, issue 1, 2002

What Makes an Allocation Fair? Some Experimental Evidence pp. 1-24

James Andreoni, Paul M. Brown and Lise Vesterlund

The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining pp. 25-43

Youngsub Chun

Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox pp. 44-76

Burkhard Hehenkamp

Contractual Signaling in a Market Environment pp. 77-98

Roman Inderst

The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma pp. 99-122

George Mailath, Ichiro Obara and Tadashi Sekiguchi

An Experimental Investigation of Unprofitable Games pp. 123-146

John Morgan and Martin Sefton

A Challenge to Formal Modeling of Poker and Bridge pp. 147-149

Fredrik A. Dahl

In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi: Memory from China pp. 150-152

Fang-Fang Tang

Volume 39, issue 2, 2002

Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence pp. 177-205

Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Karl-Martin Ehrhart and Claudia Keser

Backward Induction and the Game-Theoretic Analysis of Chess pp. 206-214

Christian Ewerhart

Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case pp. 215-236

Hanming Fang and Sergio O. Parreiras

Chores pp. 237-281

Chantale LaCasse, Clara Ponsati and Vicky Barham

Endogenous Timing with Incomplete Information and with Observable Delay pp. 282-291

Hans-Theo Normann

Bargaining and Bargaining Sets pp. 292-308

Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra

In Defense of DEFECT pp. 309-321

Oscar Volij

Volume 39, issue 1, 2002

Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk pp. 1-27

John Duffy and Nick Feltovich

Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem? pp. 28-53

Tore Ellingsen and Jack Robles

(Sophisticated) Stable Sets in Exchange Economies pp. 54-70

Joseph Greenberg, Xiao Luo, Reza Oladi and Benyamin Shitovitz

Rule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection pp. 71-90

Wei-Torng Juang

Misrepresentation of Utilities in Bargaining: Pure Exchange and Public Good Economies pp. 91-110

Özgür Kıbrıs

Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players pp. 111-136

Amnon Rapoport, Darryl A. Seale and Eyal Winter

Optimizing Information in the Herd: Guinea Pigs, Profits, and Welfare pp. 137-166

Daniel Sgroi

Violations of Belief Persistence in Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium pp. 167-174

Matthew J. Ryan

Volume 38, issue 2, 2002

The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures pp. 201-230

Anna Bogomolnaia and Matthew Jackson

Assignment Games Satisfy the CoMa-Property pp. 231-239

Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn, Tamás Solymosi, Stef Tijs and Joan Pere Villar

To Commit or Not to Commit: Endogenous Timing in Experimental Duopoly Markets pp. 240-264

Steffen Huck, Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann

Axiomatization of the Shapley Value on Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games pp. 265-277

Anirban Kar

Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency pp. 278-305

Jeffrey Kline

Perfect Information and Potential Games pp. 306-317

Nikolai Kukushkin

Stability and Segregation in Group Formation pp. 318-346

Igal Milchtaich and Eyal Winter

Strategy-Proofness and the Core in House Allocation Problems pp. 347-361

Eiichi Miyagawa

Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games pp. 362-399

Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

Volume 38, issue 1, 2002

The Scholarship Assignment Problem pp. 1-18

Pablo Amoros, Luis Corchon and Bernardo Moreno

Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions pp. 19-27

Sushil Bikhchandani, Philip Haile and John Riley

Bargaining and Boldness pp. 28-51

Albert Burgos, Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii

Coordination through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment pp. 52-88

Donald J. Dale, John Morgan and Robert Rosenthal

Computation of the Nash Equilibrium Selected by the Tracing Procedure in N-Person Games pp. 89-117

P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Antoon van den Elzen

The Newsvendor Game Has a Nonempty Core pp. 118-126

Alfred Müller, Marco Scarsini and Moshe Shaked

How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games pp. 127-155

Kathleen Valley, Leigh Thompson, Robert Gibbons and Max H. Bazerman

Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games pp. 156-175

John van Huyck, John M. Wildenthal and Raymond Battalio

Starting Small and Commitment pp. 176-199

Joel Watson

In Memoriam: John C. Harsanyi (1920-2000) pp. 200-200

Martin Shubik