Games and Economic Behavior

1989 - 2025

Current editor(s): E. Kalai

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Volume 122, issue C, 2020

Distributions of centrality on networks pp. 1-27

Krishna Dasaratha

Stability in matching markets with peer effects pp. 28-54

Anna Bykhovskaya

Competition with an information clearinghouse and asymmetric firms: Why more than two firms compete (or not) for shoppers pp. 55-82

Michael Arnold and Lan Zhang

Solving two-state Markov games with incomplete information on one side pp. 83-104

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Catherine Rainer and Eilon Solan

Fishing for fools pp. 105-129

Ulrike Malmendier and Adam Szeidl

Preordered service in contract enforcement pp. 130-149

Jan U. Auerbach and Miguel Fonseca

Frustration and anger in the Ultimatum Game: An experiment pp. 150-167

Chiara Aina, Pierpaolo Battigalli and Astrid Gamba

Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice pp. 168-202

Srinivas Arigapudi

Dynamic price discovery: Transparency vs. information design pp. 203-232

Ali Kakhbod and Fei Song

The evolution of monetary equilibrium pp. 233-239

Thomas Norman

A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria pp. 240-255

Nicola Gatti, Mario Gilli and Alberto Marchesi

Correlated beliefs: Predicting outcomes in 2 × 2 games pp. 256-276

Timothy Cason, Tridib Sharma and Radovan Vadovič

Free and perfectly safe but only partially effective vaccines can harm everyone pp. 277-289

Eduard Talamàs and Rakesh Vohra

Consulting collusive experts pp. 290-317

Dilip Mookherjee, Alberto Motta and Masatoshi Tsumagari

Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian pp. 318-327

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Ludovic Julien

In-group bias in prisons pp. 328-340

Shiqi Guo, Pinghan Liang and Erte Xiao

On self-serving strategic beliefs pp. 341-353

Nadja R. Ging-Jehli, Florian Schneider and Roberto A. Weber

Information frictions and market power: A laboratory study pp. 354-369

Anna Bayona, Jordi Brandts and Xavier Vives

Strategic decompositions of normal form games: Zero-sum games and potential games pp. 370-390

Sung-Ha Hwang and Luc Rey-Bellet

Habits as adaptations: An experimental study pp. 391-406

Ludmila Matyskova, Brian Rogers, Jakub Steiner and Keh-Kuan Sun

A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem pp. 407-412

Deniz Dizdar and Eugen Kovac

Determinants of trust: The role of personal experiences pp. 413-425

Frederik Schwerter and Florian Zimmermann

Lexicographic probabilities and robustness pp. 426-439

Henrik Petri

Allocation in multi-agenda disputes: A set-valued games approach pp. 440-452

Ehud Lehrer and Roee Teper

Information acquisition and welfare in network games pp. 453-475

C. Matthew Leister

Volume 121, issue C, 2020

Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: An experimental study pp. 1-31

Katharina Brütt, Arthur Schram and Joep Sonnemans

Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations pp. 32-54

Francis Bloch and Anne van den Nouweland

Equal sacrifice taxation pp. 55-75

John Stovall

Pre-matching gambles pp. 76-89

Hanzhe Zhang

Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating pp. 90-107

Moti Michaeli

Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation pp. 108-116

Ville Korpela and Michele Lombardi

On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining pp. 117-145

Noemí Navarro and Róbert Veszteg

A theory of decisive leadership pp. 146-168

B. Douglas Bernheim and Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed

Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs pp. 169-189

Satoshi Fukuda

Communication via intermediaries pp. 190-203

Maksymilian Kwiek

Matching through institutions pp. 204-231

Francis Bloch, David Cantala and Damián Gibaja

Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice pp. 232-251

Susann Fiedler and Adrian Hillenbrand

Unraveling over time pp. 252-264

Sandro Ambuehl and Vivienne Groves

Starting small to communicate pp. 265-296

Alp Atakan, Levent Kockesen and Elif Kubilay

Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions pp. 297-306

Justin Burkett and Kyle Woodward

Vagueness in multidimensional proposals pp. 307-328

Qiaoxi Zhang

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment pp. 329-367

Ying Xue Li and Burkhard Schipper

Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation pp. 368-381

Antonio Cabrales, Francesco Feri, Piero Gottardi and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez

Money burning in the theory of delegation pp. 382-412

Manuel Amador and Kyle Bagwell

Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets pp. 413-434

Mathew Knudson

The agency costs of on-the-job search pp. 435-452

Daniel Herbold and Heiner Schumacher

Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse pp. 453-481

B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun

Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands pp. 482-505

Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah and Alexandros Psomas

Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions pp. 506-530

Milena Wittwer

Behavioral equivalence of extensive game structures pp. 533-547

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Paolo Leonetti and Fabio Maccheroni

Affective empathy in non-cooperative games pp. 548-564

Jorge Vásquez and Marek Weretka

Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains pp. 565-584

Peng Liu