Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms

Jan Christoph Schlegel

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 123, issue C, 41-53

Abstract: We study conditions for the existence of stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that “equivalence”, properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanism.

Keywords: Matching with contracts; College admission; Substitutes; Observable substitutes; Strategy-proofness; Deferred acceptance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:41-53

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.005

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