Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Papers from arXiv.org
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that "equivalence", properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
Date: 2018-12, Revised 2019-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1812.10326 Latest version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1812.10326
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().