Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities

Jan Christoph Schlegel and Akaki Mamageishvili

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 124, issue C, 62-81

Abstract: We introduce new notions of priority-constrained efficiency and provide priority-constrained versions of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem for school choice lotteries. Moreover, we show that a priority-constrained version of a cardinal second welfare theorem fails to hold, but can be restored for a relaxed notion of equilibrium with priority-specific prices.

Keywords: Matching; Random assignments; Priority-based allocation; Constrained efficiency; Pseudo-Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:62-81

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.009

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