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Feedback spillovers across tasks, self-confidence and competitiveness

Ritwik Banerjee, Nabanita Datta Gupta and Marie Claire Villeval

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 123, issue C, 127-170

Abstract: Does feedback on success in a task increase individuals' beliefs about their chance to succeed in a subsequent, unrelated, task? Does feedback on failure have a symmetric effect? Is the distortion of beliefs, possibly due to motivated beliefs, mistakes in updating or the feeling of having a lucky day, heterogeneous across individuals, in particular according to their status in the society? Conducting an artefactual field experiment in India with participants from different castes, we show that feedback on success in a forced competition in a first task increases winners' self-confidence and competitiveness in the subsequent task. Such feedback spillovers on self-confidence are asymmetric and heterogeneous according to status and more likely for already more confident individuals.

Keywords: Feedback; Spillovers; Self-confidence; Status; Motivated beliefs; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J15 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Feedback spillovers across tasks, self-confidence and competitiveness (2020) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:127-170

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.002

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