Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game

Benjamin Sperisen and Thomas Wiseman

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 124, issue C, 491-511

Abstract: We model stable, non-assortative labor-market matchings. We endogenize how transferable utility is: a matched firm and worker play an infinite-horizon game with one-sided moral hazard. Becker's (1973) result that complementarity yields positively assortative matching fails, because increasing match quality harms dynamic incentives: a firm cannot credibly threaten to fire a worker who is productive even with low effort. Thus, firms may prefer lower-type workers who will exert more effort. We offer a new interpretation of efficiency wages: committing to a high wage improves effort incentives indirectly by increasing the firm's willingness to walk away. We also show that the set of stable outcomes has a lattice structure.

Keywords: Matching; Dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:491-511

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.011

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