Equilibrium existence in games with a concave Bayesian potential

Ezra Einy and Ori Haimanko ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 123, issue C, 288-294

Abstract: We establish existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games that have a continuous and concave potential at all states of nature, without assuming absolute continuity of information. As an application, we show that Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in many well-known games that have semi-quadratic payoffs (including Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with linear demand), for general information structures.

Keywords: Bayesian games; Bayesian potential; Equilibrium existence; Concave payoffs; Absolute continuity; Information structures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE IN GAMES WITH A CONCAVE BAYESIAN POTENTIAL (2020)
Working Paper: EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE IN GAMES WITH A CONCAVE BAYESIAN POTENTIAL (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:288-294

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.009

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