Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: Evidence from China's college admissions

Binzhen Wu and Xiaohan Zhong

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 123, issue C, 1-21

Abstract: We examine matching inequality in students' matching outcomes for the Boston Mechanism in a large matching system, by measuring the degree of mismatch for each student. We link a student's mismatch with her reporting behavior of the first choice on her preference list to explore the reasons for matching inequality. Using administrative data from college admissions in China, we find significant gender differences, rural-urban gaps, and ethnic gaps in mismatching and first-choice behavior. These demographic differences exhibit various patterns and may be explained by risk aversion, information disadvantage, and minority-preferential admissions policies, respectively.

Keywords: Chinese college admissions; Boston mechanism; Matching inequality; Strategic behavior; Mismatch (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:123:y:2020:i:c:p:1-21

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.007

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