The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences

Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li and Rui Tang

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 124, issue C, 305-318

Abstract: We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable matchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins and meets of matchings.

Keywords: Revealed preference; Stable matchings; One-sided preferences; Lattice structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:124:y:2020:i:c:p:305-318

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.015

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