The strategic value of recall

Ron Peretz

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 332-351

Abstract: This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (Lehrer, 1988; Neyman and Okada, 2009) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.

Keywords: Bounded recall; Bounded memory; Bounded rationality; Repeated games; Entropy; de Bruijn sequences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:332-351

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013

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