The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting

Sandro Brusco, Marcin Dziubiński () and Jaideep Roy

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 2, 447-469

Abstract: We consider the Hotelling–Downs model with n⩾3 office-seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of votersʼ ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize.

Keywords: Downs; Free entry; Runoff system; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:2:p:447-469

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.004

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