The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

Sandro Brusco, Marcin Dziubiński () and Jaideep Roy

No 10-02, Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n >= 2 oce seeking candidates and runo voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of voters' ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize. In this sense, our analysis suggests that two-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes.

Keywords: Downs; Free Entry; Runoff System; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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http://www.stonybrook.edu/economics/research/papers/2010/BDR20100901-1.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nys:sunysb:10-02

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