Stochastic games with information lag

Yehuda Levy

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 243-256

Abstract: Two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces are known to have undiscounted values. We study such games under the assumption that one or both players observe the actions of their opponent after some time-dependent delay. We develop criteria for the rate of growth of the delay such that a player subject to such an information lag can still guarantee himself in the undiscounted game as much as he could have with perfect monitoring. We also demonstrate that the player in the Big Match with the absorbing action subject to information lags that grows too rapidly will not be able to guarantee as much as he could have in the game with perfect monitoring.

Keywords: Stochastic game; Information lag; Incomplete information; Undiscounted value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stochastic Games with Information Lag (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:243-256

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.011

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