Minimum cost arborescences

Bhaskar Dutta and Debasis Mishra

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 74, issue 1, 120-143

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are also significant differences between the frameworks corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric cost matrices.

Keywords: Directed networks; Cost allocation; Core stability; Continuity; Cost monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Minimum Cost Arborescences (2009)
Working Paper: Minimum cost arborescences (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:74:y:2012:i:1:p:120-143

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.007

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