Minimum Cost Arborescences

Bhaskar Dutta and Debasis Mishra

No 271310, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are also significant differences between the frameworks corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric cost matrices.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2009-01-08
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Related works:
Journal Article: Minimum cost arborescences (2012)
Working Paper: Minimum cost arborescences (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:271310

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.271310

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