Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy

Carlo Prato and Stephane Wolton

Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 135, issue C, 86-95

Abstract: The Condorcet Jury Theorem and subsequent literature establish the feasibility of information aggregation in a common-value environment with exogenous policy options: a large electorate of imperfectly informed voters almost always selects the correct policy option. Rather than directly voting for policies, citizens in modern representative democracies elect candidates who make strategic policy commitments. We show that intermediation by candidates sometimes improves policy choices and sometimes impedes information aggregation. Somewhat paradoxically, the possibility of information aggregation by voters encourages strategic conformism by candidates. Correlated information or partisan biases among voters can mitigate the political failure we uncover. We also discuss possible institutional solutions.

Keywords: Information aggregation; Elections; Representative democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:135:y:2022:i:c:p:86-95

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.010

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