The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition
Ennio Bilancini and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 133, issue C, 50-57
We study the long run convention emerging from stag hunt interactions when agents occasionally revise their action over time adopting a perturbed myopic best response rule, with the novelty of introducing social competition in the form of assignment of prizes to agents depending on the payoff ranking resulting from the stag hunt interaction. We find that social competition plays a crucial and articulated role in the selection of the long run convention: indeed, a high enough reward from competition selects the payoff-dominant convention when competition is harsh, and the maximin convention when competition is mild.
Keywords: Risk-dominant; Payoff-dominant; Maximin; Stag hunt; Stochastic stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:50-57
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().