Simple equilibria in general contests
Thomas Giebe and
Oliver Gürtler ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, vol. 134, issue C, 264-280
We show how symmetric equilibria emerge in general two-player contests in which skill and effort are combined to produce output according to a general production technology and players have skills drawn from different distributions. The model includes the Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) models as special cases. Our paper provides intuition regarding how the contest components interact to determine the incentive to exert effort and sheds new light on classic comparative statics results. In particular, we show that more heterogeneity can increase equilibrium effort.
Keywords: Contest theory; Symmetric equilibrium; Heterogeneity; Risk; Stochastic dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D81 J23 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: A General Framework for Studying Contests (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:134:y:2022:i:c:p:264-280
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